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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As has been made clear in the opening briefs, the real parties
in interest in this case are Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr., as the
plaintiff/appellant and Steven C. Tycksen, Ruth Tycksen, Cheryl
Burton,

Mansell

&

Associates

defendants/appellees.

and

Eric

Heffner,

as

The other parties listed in the caption of

the case have either been ordered out by the trial court or are
defendant corporations that have no legal existence nor assets.
In their briefs the appellees have raised certain new issues with
respect to (a) the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the employment
of the parol evidence rule; and (c) that certain issues were not
raised at the trial court level, therefore cannot be raised on
appeal.

These new issues will be addressed in this Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE FINAL ORDER WAS DRAFTED BY THE DEFENDANTS; ANY
AMBIGUITY IN THE DOCUMENT MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THEM.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the plaintiff herein (see copy
attached to Docketing Statement) in part appeals from the order of
the

Second

appellees.

District

Court granting

summary

judgment

to the

That order was entered on October 8, 1992 and states

in Paragraph 1 thereof:
Summery Judgment be entered in favor of all
defendants. dismissing all causes of action against
defendants in plaintiff's complaint, (emphasis added)
(R-431)
1

Plaintiff submits that the other provisions of the Order
notwithstanding this was a final order between plaintiff and "all
defendants."
language?

What other interpretation can be made of this

On its face, it is the final order and resolves all of

plaintiff's claims against "all defendants."

At the time when

Judge Taylor signed the Order, the language of Paragraph 4 of the
Order had already been complied with and the Amended Complaint had
been filed on August 4, 1992 (R-314).

Therefore, the language of

Paragraph 4 was moot and meaningless.

In addition, the corporate

defendants are dissolved

(R-307; 30) and have no assets and

individually are not the real parties in interest. Further, since
Paragraph 1 had dismissed all causes of action against defendants,
who was there left in Paragraph 4 to be the "remaining defendants?"
All of the defendants had been joined in the plaintiff's prior
complaint and none were added by complying with Paragraph 4.
Plaintiff submits that the Order is ambiguous and meaningless, and
since the defendants drafted

it, that the ambiguity must be

construed against them and the Order deemed to be a final Order as
that term is understood under Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure as set forth below:
Rule 3.

Appeal as of right: how taken.

(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments.
An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
2

over the appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but
is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems approrpiate, which may include dismissal of the
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as
the award of attorney fees.
Utah Court Rules Annotated, Rule 3(a), P. 434.
II.

ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER.

Plaintiff believe that the Order as written and signed is a
final order, since the standing of the corporate defendants is not
at issue nor are the corporations necessary parties as defined by
the Utah Supreme Court when it said:
. . . a necessary party is one whose presence is required
for a full and fair determination of his rights as well
as of the rights of the other parties to the suit.
Cowan & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co. . 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Ut.
1984) . The Court can take judicial notice of their defunct status.
These are not contested facts (R-029 and 030 on Tebco and R-307 on
Tebco Construction). In addition, their defunct status was proven
before the trial court and not contested in the pleadings (R 450,
Paragraph III) at the time when the Agreement (R 120-123) was
presented to plaintiff in which they are purported to be the owners
and sellers of the property.

This Agreement is dated October 3,

1985 and has been before the trial court as uncontested evidence
since the initial complaint was filed.
3

(See R 017-020).

Obviously

a

corporation,

or

corporations,

represented other than by their officers.

cannot

be

The representations of

the officers is what is important and at issue and what was said
and represented to plaintiff by said officers in the Agreement
presented at the closing upon which the defendants rely.
officers are parties defendant.

These

Therefore, it appears to the

plaintiff that it is an exercise in futility to have to go back to
the trial court to prove that the corporations recited in the
"Agreement"

(R 120-123) were in fact defunct at the time the

Agreement was drafted by the defendants, when in fact these are
uncontested

facts before the Court.

With respect to TEBCO,

Incorporated, this was before the trial court as early as June 27,
1986 (R-024) as part of plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to a
motion to dismiss made by the defendants tycksen and Burton. With
respect to TEBCO Construction, the issue of its defunct nature was
raised in the initial complaint (R-005, paragraph 9) dated April
24, 1986 and confirmed by a certificate of involuntary dissolution
(R-307) dated March 31, 1986.

The real issue is whether or not

plaintiff was induced to sign both the "EMSA" (R 118-119) and the
closing "Agreement," based upon the misrepresentations of the
defendants, both oral and written in the documents themselves. As
both documents have been part of the case since its inception, the
issues were plainly before the trial court.
4

Since the corporate

defendants are non-entities and do not exist, they cannot be in
reality parties defendant since in order to exist a corporation
must have a charter. Therefore, any reference to them in the final
order of this court is meaningless and is null and void.
III. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THAT STATEMENTS
IN AN AGREEMENT ARE FALSE.
The defendants misconstrue the application of the parol
evidence rule. Plaintiff has not attempted to demonstrate anything
other than the fact that the "Agreement" prepared by defendants (R
120-123) had within it false statements of fact.

(See Page 11 of

Appellant's Brief) at the time it was prepared.

It is a common

fiat of the law that agreements are governed by the existing law
of this state at the time they are entered into. Plaintiff submits
that the statutes of the state were applicable to the Agreement
from the time it was prepared and signed and the application of
these statutes does not violate the principle of parol evidence.
To argue otherwise would be to allow knowing persons to contract
for unlawful and illegal purposes and claim the intercession of the
Parol Evidence Rule when the innocent party sought to enforce the
written agreement.

In addition, if the application of statutory

language could be deemed to be extrinsic or parol evidence, then
the ruling of this court in Sparrow v. Tayco, 206 UAR 8 (Ut. App.
1993) would allow it in.

However, the real issue is not the
5

question of parol evidence, but whether or not the plaintiff was
induced

to

sign

the

documents

he

signed

based

upon

the

misrepresentations made in the documents themselves, and then
orally by the defendants.

In addition, may the trial court look

only to certain provisions of an agreement to the exclusion of
others in making its decision?

Plaintiff submits that the trial

court must look to the arguments in their entirety in making its
decision.

Jones v. Hinckle, 611 P.2d 733 (Ut. 1980) and if the

documents are full of errors, misstatements, and false facts, then
they are null and void.

Tanner v. District Judges, 649 P.2d (Ut.

1982) . With respect to the EMSA, that document speaks for itself
and contains the conditional language within it which was not met.
IV.

ALL ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT WERE RAISED BELOW.

The defendants claim that plaintiff failed to raise certain
issues in the court below pertaining to the EMSA (R-015) and the
fact that plaintiff is not bound by the Agreement (R-017) because
he was unable to judge the true construction of the same and had
no opportunity for counsel.

These two documents have been before

the court in their entirety since the institution of the suit (see
original

Complaint).

There

is no ambiguity

claimed

in the

respective documents; therefore, the intent of the parties is
expressed in them and the court "must look to the agreement itself,
in its entirety . . . "

Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt
6

Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357 (Ut. App. 1987).

Accordingly the EMSA

contained more language in it than the language quoted by the
defendants.

Plaintiff submits that since the EMSA has been

submitted to the trial court since the inception of the case, that
the document in its entirety was before the court—including the
paragraphs—posing conditions of its acceptance.

With respect to

the EMSA, the Supreme Court has said that the intentions of the
parties is binding upon them and their intentions are found in
their contract.

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.,

743 P.2d 1205 (appeal after remand 795 P.2d 678) (Ut. 1987).

The

issue of the Ogden Housing Authority and its being a condition of
the EMSA has been joined since the filing of the original complaint
(R-001).

On April 24, 1986, one of the allegations of fraud from

the beginning has been that the defendants told plaintiff Johnson
this provision of the EMSA had been met when in fact it had not.
(R-003-004).
dispute

of

Also see (R-439) where plaintiff raises the issue in
the

defendants1

alleged

statement

of

facts,

in

plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. Also (R-445). Therefore
this issue was clearly before the trial court.

In addition, the

question of plaintiff's visual inspection was also raised at (R452) in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Ogden Housing Authority issue is
7

also raised on the same page (R-452) .

Likewise, the issue of

plaintiff's inability to understand, judge properly, and seek legal
advice on the Agreement he signed at closing was raised in
plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment (see R-450; 442). Lastly, these issues were all
raised in plaintiff's Affidavit (R-024) dated June 27, 1986.

To

say that these issues have not been raised before the trial court
is to abandon the record.
CONCLUSION
The order of the court is a final order as to all parties as
that language is interpreted under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the defendant corporations are nonentities and are not real parties defendant.

The actual parties

are Reynold Q. Johnson, the Tycksens, Cheryl Burton, Mansell and
Associates and Eric heffner. The order of the trial court resolves
all of the matters as between them, therefore is an appealable
order.

The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply where the court is

interpreting the language of the contracts themselves and applying
statutory language to the contracts does not constitute
evidence.

parol

In addition, the trial court has the authority to seek

extrinsic evidence in its discretion in interpreting contracts if
it feels the documents do not express the intent of the parties.
All of the issues argued by plaintiff were clearly before the trial
court, as found in the pleadings, the documents and the memoranda
submitted. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff requests that
8

the summary judgment heretofore entered be vacated and the case
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Dated this 16th day of April, 1993.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

X^aham Dodd
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 16th day of April, 1993, I mailed two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT postage
prepaid, to each of the following:
Steven C. Tycksen, Esq.
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Nicholas E. Hales, Esq.
265 East 100 South
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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